University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2017

Educational Equality for Children with Disabilities: The 2016 Term
Cases
Samuel R. Bagenstos

University of Michigan Law School, sambagen@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/112

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Disability Law Commons, Education Law Commons,
Juvenile Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Publication Information & Recommended Citation
Bagenstos, Samuel. "Educational Equality for Children with Disabilities: The 2016 Term Cases." In
American Constitution Society Supreme Court Review 2016-2017, edited by S. D. Schwinn, 17-48.
American Constitution Society, 2017.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Educational Equality for
Children with Disabilities:
The 2016 Term Cases
Samuel R. Bagenstos*

I. Introduction: Equality versus Adequacy in the Education
of Disabled Children
One of the most longstanding debates in educational policy
pits the goal of equality against the goal of adequacy: Should we
aim to guarantee that all children receive an equal education? Or
simply that they all receive an adequate education?
The debate is vexing in part because there are many ways to
specify “equality” and “adequacy.” Are we talking about equality
of inputs (which inputs?), equality of opportunity (to achieve
what?), or equality of results (which results?)? Douglas Rae and
his colleagues famously argued that there are no fewer than 108
structurally distinct conceptions of equality.1 And how do we
determine what is adequate? To do so, we need some normative
understanding of what education is for: Economic independence?
Democratic citizenship? Self-actualization? Something else?
The general equality-versus-adequacy debate replicates
itself at a more specific level when we focus on the educational
* Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A very preliminary
version of this essay was presented as the 2017 Ken Campbell Lecture on Disability Law and
Policy at The Ohio State University. The author was counsel for Petitioners in Fry v. Napoleon
Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017), one of the principal cases discussed in this piece, and counsel
for amici in Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017), the other
principal case discussed in this piece. The views expressed here are those of the author only.
1
See Douglas W. Rae, Equalities 133 (1983).
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services provided to students with disabilities. When Congress
adopted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in
1975 (the “EAHCA,” the statute now known as the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, or “IDEA”), it estimated that
a million disabled children “were ‘excluded entirely from
the public school system’” with millions more “receiving an
inappropriate education.”2 The EAHCA required that every child
with a disability receive a “free appropriate public education.”3
That mandate plainly barred schools from excluding disabled
children, but what kind of education was required? What was
“appropriate”?
In its earliest case under the EACHA—the Rowley case,
decided in 1982—the Court refused to read the requirement
of an “appropriate” education for children with disabilities as
guaranteeing that they receive “‘equal’ educational opportunities.”4
It instead adopted a variant of an adequacy standard: “We therefore
conclude that the ‘basic floor of opportunity’ provided by the Act
consists of access to specialized instruction and related services
which are individually designed to provide educational benefit
to the handicapped child.”5 But the Court declined to “establish
any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits
conferred upon all children covered by the Act.”6
In the years since Rowley, at least three developments have
pushed education policy generally—and disability education
policy specifically—towards a greater focus on equality. First,
in 1990, Congress adopted the Americans with Disabilities Act
 d. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982) (quoting Act of Nov. 29, 1975, § 3(b)(3), 89 Stat.
B
774 (“Statement of Legislative Findings and Purpose”)).
3
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2015).
4
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198-201.
5
Id. at 201.
6
Id. at 202.
2
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(“ADA”), which aimed “to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”7 The ADA applies its requirements
of nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation to every
state and local government entity, as well as every seller of goods
and services in the United States economy. It thus covers both
public and private schools, from pre-kindergarten through graduate
school.
Second, in 2002 President George W. Bush signed the No
Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”). Among its many controversial
provisions, No Child Left Behind sought to hold states accountable
for achievement gaps between demographic groups. The law
expressly stated that students with disabilities would presumptively
be served in the general education curriculum and be measured by
the same achievement standards as their nondisabled peers.8
Third, in a series of reauthorizations through the years,
Congress amended the IDEA to give added emphasis to the
statute’s equal opportunity goals. When it reauthorized the
statute after the enactment of No Child Left Behind, Congress
added provisions that explicitly referred to the results-oriented
accountability standards of NCLB.9
In light of these developments, a number of scholars and
activists urged that the courts should give the IDEA’s free
appropriate public education requirement a more robust reading
than Rowley had placed on it.10 The lower courts consistently
rebuffed those efforts, however. If anything, they took the law in
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2015).
For a discussion of the NCLB provisions regarding disabled students, see Stephen A.
Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside A New IDEA, Getting Behind No Child Left
Behind and Getting Outside of It All, 15 Hastings Women’s L.J. 1, 26-30 (2004).
9
See generally Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1475 (2015)).
10
See, e.g., Maureen A. MacFarlane, The Shifting Floor of Educational Opportunity: The Impact
7
8
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the opposite direction—they read Rowley as holding that virtually
any educational benefit received by a disabled student, even an
incredibly minimal one, was sufficient to provide a free appropriate
public education.
This past Term, the Court revisited Rowley for the first time
since that case was decided 35 years earlier. In Endrew F. v.
Douglas County School District RE-1,11 the Court rejected the
“merely more than de minimis” test that the Tenth Circuit had
applied to determine what educational benefit was sufficient for a
free appropriate public education. But it specifically rejected the
Petitioner’s argument that the IDEA required schools to aim to
provide an equal educational opportunity.
By rejecting an equal-opportunity standard for determining
compliance with the free appropriate public education requirement,
Endrew F., like Rowley before it, responded to the difficulty in
specifying equal opportunity in a way that courts can implement.
In some respects, I will argue, that decision was understandable
and perhaps sensible. But equal opportunity concerns still lie
below the surface of the Court’s opinion in Endrew F., and they
remain a crucial foundation of the IDEA’s requirements.
And, exactly one month before it decided Endrew F., the
Court made clear that children with disabilities are entitled to an
equal educational opportunity. That entitlement rests, not on the
IDEA, but on the ADA. In Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools,12
the Court held that a disabled child could enforce the ADA’s
requirements of equal participation in education independently of
the IDEA—and could do so without first going through the IDEA’s

of Educational Reform on Rowley, 41 J.L. & Educ. 45, 46-47 (2012) (citing articles and cases in
which this argument was made).
11
Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
12
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
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complex administrative procedures, so long as she was not seeking
relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education. When
Fry and Endrew F. are read together, they establish that children
with disabilities do have federal rights to equal opportunity in
education—but that the ADA, not the IDEA, is the key vehicle
for enforcing those rights. The equality right under the ADA
is different in important ways from the one that the Endrew F.
petitioner asked the Court to read into the IDEA, though.
II. Endrew F.: The Equality Claim the Court Rejected
A. The Endrew F. Decision
When the Court granted certiorari in Endrew F., advocates
had high hopes that its decision would give more robust content
to the free appropriate public education requirement than it had
in Rowley. At the same time, though, they feared that the Court
would freeze into place the very lenient standards adopted by the
lower courts. In the end, neither advocates’ greatest hopes nor
their greatest fears were realized.
Endrew F. is an autistic child.13 He attended public school
in Douglas County, Colorado, from preschool through the fourth
grade, pursuant to Individualized Education Programs (“IEPs”)
drafted for him each year as the IDEA requires. When it came time
to draft his fifth grade IEP, however, Endrew’s parents believed
that a change was necessary. They believed that “his academic
and functional progress had essentially stalled: Endrew’s IEPs
largely carried over the same basic goals and objectives from one
year to the next, indicating that he was failing to make meaningful
progress toward his aims.”14 When the school district did not agree

13
14

Facts in this paragraph are taken from the Court’s opinion in Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 996-997.
Id. at 996.
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to make any changes to the IEP, Endrew’s parents decided to enroll
him in a private school for autistic children.
Under longstanding IDEA case law, parents whose disabled
children do not receive a free appropriate public education in
their local school district are entitled to receive reimbursement of
private school tuition from that district.15 Accordingly, Endrew’s
parents filed an administrative complaint under the IDEA seeking
tuition reimbursement. (The IDEA requires parents first to file
their cases before a state administrative law judge before raising
a claim under the statute in court.16) They argued that the school
district had denied Endrew a free appropriate public education,
because its IEPs were insufficiently ambitious. But the ALJ
disagreed. The parents sought review in federal district court, but
that court affirmed the decision, as did the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The appellate court read Rowley “to mean that a child’s
IEP is adequate as long as it is calculated to confer an ‘educational
benefit [that is] merely . . . more than de minimis.’”17 And it
held that the school district had satisfied that standard, because
“Endrew’s IEP had been ‘reasonably calculated to enable [him] to
make some progress.’”18
The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had applied
too lenient a standard. “When all is said and done,” the Court
explained, “a student offered an educational program providing
‘merely more than de minimis’ progress from year to year can
hardly be said to have been offered an education at all.”19 It
held that “[t]he IDEA demands more. It requires an educational

See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2015).
17
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 997 (quoting Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist.
RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted by Supreme
Court)).
18
Id. (quoting Endrew F., 798 F.3d at 1342 (internal quotation marks omitted by Supreme Court)).
19
Id. at 1001.
15
16
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program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”20
But although both Endrew’s parents and various amici argued
that the IDEA should be read as imposing an equal-educationalopportunity standard, the Court rejected those arguments. The
Court relied entirely on Rowley, which had said that “[t]he
requirement that States provide ‘equal’ educational opportunities
would . . . seem to present an entirely unworkable standard
requiring impossible measurements and comparisons.”21 The
Endrew F. Court concluded that “Congress (despite several
intervening amendments to the IDEA) ha[d] not materially
changed the statutory definition of a FAPE [a free appropriate
public education] since Rowley was decided,” and it “decline[d] to
interpret the FAPE provision in a manner so plainly at odds with
the Court’s analysis in that case.”22
B. The Difficulties With an Equality Standard Under the IDEA
What, precisely, was the equal opportunity standard Endrew’s
parents proposed? They asked the Court to hold that the IDEA
requires “‘an education that aims to provide a child with a
disability opportunities to achieve academic success, attain selfsufficiency, and contribute to society that are substantially equal
to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities.’”23 It is
hardly surprising that the Court refused to adopt this formulation as
the standard school districts were required to follow, because every
piece of it is vague.
There are several distinct ways of cashing out the idea of

Id.
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198)).
22
Id.
23
Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 40, Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827)).
20
21
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educational equality. Nearly all of these would be plausibly
consistent with the standard proposed by Endrew’s parents. Yet
each presents significant difficulties.
One way of assessing educational equality is to look to
outcomes. To take the terms used by Endrew’s parents, perhaps
we should say that equality requires that all children achieve
a “substantially equal” level of “academic success,” “selfsufficiency” or “contribut[ions] to society” as each other. This
sort of outcome-oriented equality might make sense when we are
focusing on particular basic competencies. As Michael Walzer
notes, the job of a teacher of reading is to teach her students to
read—not to give them an equal opportunity to learn to read.24
But as we focus on broader educational outcomes, the equalachievement goal seems increasingly unreasonable. In any
world we can realistically imagine, children will be different,
and to expect schools to bring every child to the same level of
achievement seems utopian at best, dystopian (the stuff of the Kurt
Vonnegut story Harrison Bergeron25) at worst.26
If an equal-achievement standard seems unworkable and
extreme, the obvious place to turn is to some notion of equal
opportunity.27 Every child can’t be expected to achieve at the
same level, but surely we can give every child the same chance to
achieve.
But what does this mean? Perhaps it simply means that we
should devote the same resources to each child’s education as we
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 203 (1983).
Kurt Vonnegut, Harrison Bergeron, in Welcome to the Monkey House 7 (1968).
26
For a theoretical defense of an equal-outcomes standard in education, see Tammy Harel BenShahar, Equality in Education – Why We Must Go All the Way, 19 Ethical Theory & Moral Prac.
83 (2016).
27
For some appropriate skepticism that the distinction between equality of opportunity and equality
of result is meaningful normatively, see David A. Strauss, The Illusory Distinction Between
Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Result, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 171 (1992). But the
distinction is useful for purposes of my discussion.
24
25
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devote to each other child’s education. Christopher Jencks calls
this conception of equal opportunity “democratic equality.”28 He
dismisses this conception quickly—though he allows that it has
the distinct advantage of being more administrable than other
instantiations of equal opportunity and thus might be a default that
could garner broad support.29
As a pure normative matter, the narrow and formal “democratic
equality” principle seems quite insufficient. Students will differ
from one another for a variety of reasons. As a result, different
students will need different resource inputs to learn the same
material as their classmates, have the same chance to learn the
same material as their classmates, have the same chance to achieve
their potential as their classmates, and so forth. If we care about
equal educational opportunity because we want to give all children
equal chances to learn, then allocating the same resources to each
student seems both over- and under-inclusive—it gives some more
than they need, and others less.
The problem is particularly acute in the disability context.
Accommodations for students with disabilities often cost money.
Even if the cost of those accommodations is often exaggerated—
as it is—the cost still exists. At least for many students with
disabilities, then, the “democratic equality” principle will
deny them equal opportunities to learn as are enjoyed by their
classmates.
So we need a more robust conception of equal educational
opportunity. Responding to the limitations of the input-oriented
“democratic equality” view, and the over-ambitiousness of the
equal-outcomes view, many advocates have sought to define
Christopher Jencks, Whom Must We Treat Equally for Educational Opportunity to be Equal?, 98
Ethics 518, 520 (1988).
29
See id. at 532.
28
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educational equality by reference to a child’s potential. In the
Rowley case, the lower courts interpreted the EAHCA to require
that a disabled child receive “an opportunity to achieve [her] full
potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other
children.”30 The Supreme Court, as we have seen, rejected that
interpretation, both in Rowley and in Endrew F.
Was the Court wrong to do so? There is something very
attractive in saying that the point of public education is to give
each child the same opportunity to achieve her potential. But can
equal-opportunity-to-achieve-potential work as an operative legal
standard that governs decisions regarding what services to give
individual children? There are a number of reasons for skepticism.
First, how do we measure a child’s potential? When we are
deciding what educational interventions to provide a child ex ante,
all we can do is predict, based on generalizations that are sure to
be overbroad, what developmental path a particular child will take.
And when we are judging the sufficiency of those educational
interventions ex post, our counterfactuals about what the child
would have achieved if she had received different interventions are
likely to rely on similarly overbroad generalizations.
Because of the difficulty of prediction, the application of an
equal-opportunity-to-achieve-potential standard in practice is likely
to turn on—and thus reinforce—existing stereotypes about what
individuals with particular diagnoses and conditions can achieve.
But, as the Endrew F. Court noted, “[a] focus on the particular
child is at the core of the IDEA. The instruction offered must be
‘specially designed’ to meet a child’s ‘unique needs’ through an
‘[i]ndividualized education program.’”31 Although on-the-ground
30
31

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(29) & (14) (2015)) (emphasis in the
Court’s opinion)).
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practice under the statute does not always live up to this guarantee
of individualization,32 an effort to focus on an individual child’s
potential would, perhaps perversely, exacerbate the problem.
Relatedly, making a child’s entitlements turn purely on an
assessment of that child’s potential would provide a ready avenue
for stigma and prejudice against disabled children to enter the
decisionmaking process—and effectively ratchet down the rights
guaranteed by the IDEA. There is a longstanding pattern—among
teachers, school administrators, courts, and even sometimes
parents—of underestimating the potential of children with
disabilities. A legal requirement that is built around an assessment
of potential may simply entrench the existing low expectations for
disabled children.
Finally, despite its initial appeal, there are serious normative
questions about a guarantee that all children should have the same
opportunity to achieve their potential. First, even considered in the
abstract, it is unclear why one’s potential is a normatively valuable
referent. Many people are drawn to a potential-maximizing
standard based on the casual utilitarian assumption that society
benefits when people achieve the most that they can. But a
utilitarian would have to consider costs along with those benefits.
And once we take costs into account, utilitarianism does not seem
to suggest that we should provide children an equal opportunity to
achieve their potential.33
Consider two children. Emily has the potential to learn to
See, e.g., Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Special Kids, Special Parents, Special Education, 47 U. Mich.
J.L. Reform 733, 767 (2014).
33
The discussion in text assumes that potential is static, or at least is unaffected by our decisions
about where to invest educational resources. But if a child’s potential is responsive to those
investment decisions—such as, if investing resources in children with more potential encourages
children to take actions that expand their potential—then the calculus gets even more complicated.
For this reason Jencks argues persuasively that a utilitarian approach to equal educational
opportunity is indeterminate. See Jencks, supra note 28, at 529.
32
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care for herself, and perhaps to learn to perform certain repetitive
tasks, but due to a disability she has no potential to learn to engage
in more complex intellectual and social tasks. (Leave aside for a
moment the questions of how we know her true potential, and of
whether we are underestimating her.) But educating her to her full
potential will be cheap and easy; it will require the investment of
very few resources.
Felicia, by contrast, has the potential to learn everything
Emily can learn, plus the potential to understand and advance
knowledge in cutting-edge scientific fields, and the potential to
learn to navigate complex social situations. For Felicia to achieve
that potential, however, will require an extensive investment of
resources—orders of magnitude greater than the investment that is
required to enable Emily to achieve her full potential. If we give
Emily all the resources she needs, are we bound to give Felicia
the many more resources she needs to have a commensurate
opportunity to achieve her full potential?
A utilitarian would likely say no. To a utilitarian, the question
would be which allocation of marginal resources has the greatest
marginal effect on the relevant achievement measure. At the point
at which the marginal cost of investing resources in a particular
child exceeds the marginal benefit, a utilitarian would say that we
should invest additional resources in someone else. So, perhaps at
some point Felicia will be able to achieve enough of her potential
that the benefits of her achieving more of that potential are less
than the cost of the resources that it will take to enable her to make
the next leap. And perhaps the marginal benefits of giving Emily
the relatively small allocation of resources she needs to achieve
her full potential always exceed the marginal costs. If that is right,
then perhaps Emily is normatively entitled to more than an equal
opportunity to achieve her potential, and Felicia is entitled to less.
28
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But a utilitarian calculus will not always be beneficial to
children with disabilities. If the costs in my hypothetical were
flipped, it would be the nondisabled Felicia, rather than the
disabled Emily, who would be entitled to a more-than-equal
opportunity. Either way, utilitarianism does not seem to offer a
persuasive grounding for an equal-opportunity-to-achieve-potential
principle.
A focus on potential poses still a deeper problem for
egalitarians. Where does potential come from, after all? Potential
depends, in the first instance, on the physical and mental attributes
with which a child is born (and their degree of compatibility with
the physical and social environment in which she is born). But
that is, of course, simply a matter of brute luck—the lottery of
birth. By the time the child gets to school, her potential will have
been significantly affected by the physical, social, and economic
environment in which she has been raised for her first few years.
That, too, is a matter of luck. Children with higher potential, then,
are likely to be children who were lucky enough to have been born
and raised in circumstances that increased their potential—and it
should not at all surprise us if those children are also the children
who experience more socioeconomic advantages generally. A
principle that requires us to give every child the same opportunity
to achieve his or her potential thus will likely replicate, reinforce,
and retransmit existing inequalities. It will, on average, give
more to the children who are already more advantaged—reversing
those egalitarian principles that enjoin us to give more priority to
those who are less advantaged.34 One might, therefore, say that

34

See Gina Schouten, Fair Educational Opportunity and the Distribution of Natural Ability: Toward
a Prioritarian Principle of Educational Justice, 46 J. Phil. Educ. 472 (2012); see generally Derek
Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 Ratio 202, 213 (1997) (describing and defending the view that
“[b]enefiting people matters more the worse off these people are”).
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the equal-opportunity-to-achieve-potential rule gets things exactly
backwards from an egalitarian perspective—that the state has an
obligation to intervene to give more to those children who have
less potential, in part because it is the state’s failure to intervene
earlier that created the social and economic conditions that limited
their potential.35
In principle, we could try to solve this problem by “purifying”
the concept of potential. We could attempt to strip away all of the
ways that society—by acting and failing to act—limited a child’s
ability to achieve, and then require the state to give every child
the same opportunity to reach that pure form of potential. Once
we strip away all of the social contributions to potential, though,
there may be very little left to distinguish among children. This
is true even for children with disabilities. It is a basic tenet of
the “social model” underlying modern disability rights advocacy
that disability is not a condition that is inherent to the physical
body of an individual but that it instead results from an interaction
between her body and social decisions.36 What makes an inability
to walk disabling, the argument goes, is not merely the physical
condition (say, quadriplegia) that creates the inability, but instead
the decisions to create buildings with stairs instead of elevators, to
fail to invest in accessible public transit, and so forth.
But if the lion’s share of the difference in different children’s
“potential” results from social decisions, that means that the
equal-opportunity-to-achieve-potential principle comes close to
collapsing into a requirement of equal outcomes—a requirement
J encks calls this an argument for “strong humane justice,” which he finds normatively appealing
but impractical to achieve. See Jencks, supra note 27, at 527. Schouten argues that Jencks’s
principle of “weak humane justice” must be supplemented with a “prioritarian principle of
educational justice” to reduce inequalities that result from natural and social disadvantages. See
Schouten, supra note 34, at 483-487.
36
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 Va. L. Rev. 397, 428429 (2000).
35
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we have already determined to be too ambitious. As Jencks
says, “if equal opportunity means that children raised in different
families must have equal probabilities of success, we can never
fully achieve it.”37
C. A Robust Adequacy Standard Driven by Equality Concerns
The foregoing discussion should make clear the difficulties
in crafting an equal-educational-opportunity standard that both is
normatively appealing and can be applied by courts and school
districts. In light of these difficulties, it is hardly surprising that
Rowley and Endrew F. refused to impose such a standard. But that
does not mean that Endrew F. disregarded the principles of equal
educational opportunity. To the contrary, I submit, the best way to
understand the rules adopted by the Court is to see them as a way
of implementing equal educational opportunity, without requiring
an impractical case-by-case equality analysis.
Endrew F. held that “[w]hen a child is fully integrated in the
regular classroom, as the Act prefers, what [meeting the child’s
unique needs] typically means is providing a level of instruction
reasonably calculated to permit advancement through the general
curriculum.”38 In his unanimous opinion for the Court, Chief
Justice Roberts described the IDEA as an “ambitious” piece of
legislation,39 and that the educational program provided to a

Jencks, supra note 27, at 527. John Roemer attempts to address this problem by suggesting that
equal educational opportunity cannot be achieved on an individual basis. Rather, he suggests
that “the equal-opportunity policy must equalize, in some average sense . . . the educational
achievements of all types [i.e., social groupings], but not equalize the achievements within types,
which differ according to effort.” John E. Roemer, Equality of Opportunity 7 (2000). But Debra
Satz persuasively suggests that “the equalization of children’s potentials (on average) across social
types” is not “even plausible as a guiding principle for educational policy, particularly in a society
marked by inequalities outside education.” Debra Satz, Equality, Adequacy, and Educational
Policy, 3 Educ. Fin. & Pol’y 424, 430 (2008).
38
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000.
39
Id. at 999.
37
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disabled child must accordingly “be appropriately ambitious.”40
He explained that the statute’s substantive standard must “focus[]
on student progress.”41 And he said that “every child should have
the chance to meet challenging objectives.”42
This language, combined with the Court’s rejection of the
merely-more-than-de-minimis standard, imposes a robust adequacy
requirement on school districts in their education of disabled
children. Understood in the light of the IDEA’s strong presumption
toward serving children with disabilities alongside nondisabled
children43—a presumption to which the Court specifically referred
(“as the Act prefers”)—that standard significantly advances the
equality interests of disabled children.
In the equality-versus-adequacy debate in education policy
generally, a number of scholars have argued that adequacy rules
are best understood as serving equality.44 Debra Satz, for example,
emphasizes the importance of an adequate education in promoting
civic equality by giving everyone the tools to engage in political
self-governance and to earn income in the market.45 The robust
education required by the Endrew F. standard is well suited to
preparing individuals with disabilities to engage in these activities.
Elizabeth Anderson focuses specifically on the role of educational
integration in promoting civic equality.46 By recognizing the
statute’s background preference for integration, Endrew F. fits

Id. at 1000.
Id. at 999.
42
Id. at 1000.
43
For a discussion of the IDEA’s integration presumption, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Abolish the
Integration Presumption? Not Yet, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 157 (2007).
44
See, e.g., Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 477, 480
(2014); see generally Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Slaying the Inequality Villain in School
Finance: Is the Right to Education the Silver Bullet?, 20 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 351 (2011).
45
See Satz, supra note 37.
46
Elizabeth Anderson, Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective, 117
Ethics 595 (2007).
40
41
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Anderson’s argument well. It also fits Martha Nussbaum’s
argument that the IDEA serves the interest in equal protection of
disabled children by requiring extensive educational interventions
to enable those children to enter society as full participants. As
Nussbaum argues, even if the statute does not require equal
outcomes, it demonstrates equal concern for children with
disabilities by insisting on those extensive interventions.47
Does Endrew F. adopt an equality standard? Not directly.
The Court specifically rejected a test under which a school
district’s responsibilities to a particular child would depend on an
assessment of what would give that child an opportunity that was
equal to that enjoyed by her classmates. But the Court adopted
a robust adequacy standard that plainly serves the interest in
achieving educational equality—and that makes no sense absent an
underlying commitment to educational equality. Although Endrew
F. rejected the parents’ equality claim, I submit that it is still best
understood as a case about equality.
III. Fry: The Equality Claim the Court Embraced
A. The Fry Decision
On its face, Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools48 was not a
case about educational equality. Indeed, it was not even a case
about the substance of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act. Rather, the case involved the relationship between the IDEA
and other statutes, notably the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The question before the court was whether a disabled child could
enforce rights under those other statutes without first exhausting
the administrative proceedings required by the IDEA. The Court
 artha Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities, 40 Metaphilosophy
M
331, 341-343 (2009).
48
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
47
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held that such a child need not go through proceedings under the
IDEA so long as the “gravamen” of her suit under another statute
“is something other than the denial of the IDEA’s core guarantee”
of a “free appropriate public education.”49 Although the Court’s
decision does not embrace any particular substantive standard, it
opens the way to meaningful enforcement of an equality principle
under the ADA that is very similar to the one the plaintiff in
Rowley unsuccessfully sought to interject into the IDEA.
Ehlena Fry (referred to in the Court’s decision as “E.F.”) has
cerebral palsy.50 At her doctor’s suggestion, Ehlena’s parents
obtained a service dog for her when she was a young child. The
parents chose for the job a goldendoodle (a species that is often
used for service animals, because few people are allergic to it).
The family named the dog “Wonder.” Wonder assisted Ehlena
with such activities as “‘retrieving dropped items, helping her
balance when she uses her walker, opening and closing doors,
turning on and off lights, helping her take off her coat, [and]
helping her transfer to and from the toilet.’”51
When Ehlena enrolled in her local public school’s kindergarten,
the school refused to allow Wonder to accompany her. Instead,
it offered the services of a one-on-one human aide, who would
perform all of the tasks that the dog would. When, by the end of
the year, the principal decided to stick with the refusal to permit
Wonder to work as a service dog, Ehlena’s parents pulled her out
of school and filed a complaint with the United States Department
of Education’s Office for Civil Rights. That complaint alleged that
the school had violated Ehlena’s rights under the ADA by denying

Id. at 748.
Facts in this paragraph and the next are taken from the Court’s opinion. See Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 75051.
51
Id. at 751 (quoting Complaint at ¶ 27, Fry, 137 S. Ct. 743 (No. 15-497)).
49
50
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her the chance to use her service dog. It did not allege a violation
of the IDEA.
School officials defended against the administrative complaint
by arguing that “that they [w]ere not required to permit the service
animal to accompany and assist [Ehlena], because they [we]re
meeting all of [her] educational needs through the provision of an
aide.”52 But the Department of Education rejected the defense and
concluded that the school district had violated the ADA. Ehlena
alleged a violation of the ADA’s requirement that a state or local
government entity must provide “reasonable modifications to rules,
policies, or practices” where necessary to avoid discrimination
on the basis of disability53—a requirement that has long been
interpreted to demand that such entities permit disabled users of
their facilities to be assisted by service dogs.54 Because Ehlena
argued that the school had denied her the equal access to its
facilities that the ADA guaranteed, rather than that the school had
denied her a free appropriate public education, the Department
of Education concluded that a “FAPE analysis” was beside the
point.55 The Department “analogized the school’s conduct to
‘requir[ing] a student who uses a wheelchair to be carried’ by an
aide or ‘requir[ing] a blind student to be led [around by a] teacher’
instead of permitting him to use a guide dog or cane.”56 Those
examples, like the school’s denial of a service dog, did not deny a
free appropriate public education, but they did violate the ADA “by
discriminating against children with disabilities.”57
The Department of Education ordered the school district to
Joint Appx. at 28, Fry, 137 S. Ct. 743 (No. 15-497) (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2015).
54
28 C.F.R. § 35.136(g) (2016).
55
Joint Appx. at 35, Fry, 137 S. Ct. 743 (No. 15-497) (emphasis added).
56
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 751 (quoting Joint Appx. at 35, Fry, 137 S. Ct. 743 (No. 15-497)).
57
Id.
52
53
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readmit Ehlena (who had been homeschooled during the two years
during which her complaint was pending) and to permit her to use
her service dog. But Ehlena’s parents became concerned, after
meeting with the principal, that the school would “resent” being
required to allow Wonder to attend and, as a result, would make
Ehlena’s “return to school difficult.”58 They decided to enroll
Ehlena in a neighboring district, and to file a lawsuit against her
original school for violating the ADA by refusing to allow her to
use her service dog.59 Because the case focused entirely on the
school district’s past conduct, and neither Ehlena nor her parents
had any desire to re-enroll her in the district, the lawsuit sought
only retrospective relief—damages for Ehlena’s emotional distress
in being denied the use of her dog and the corresponding ability to
participate independently in the classroom.60
The lower courts dismissed the ADA suit, because they
concluded that Ehlena’s parents should first have exhausted
administrative remedies under the IDEA.61 Unlike the federal
Department of Education complaint process in which Ehlena’s
parents originally pursued their ADA claims, the IDEA’s
administrative scheme requires parents to proceed before a stateappointed hearing officer or administrative law judge, who will
hold a trial-type hearing and issue a decision that will then be
subject to judicial review in federal district court.62 Although
Ehlena’s parents did not allege that the school violated the
IDEA, the lower courts concluded that exhaustion of the statute’s
procedures was required anyway, because of a provision Congress
added to the IDEA in 1986. That provision, in its current form,
reads:
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
60
Id. at 751-752.
61
Id. at 752.
62
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2015).
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 othing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit
N
the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the
Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal
laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,
except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws
seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter,
the [administrative] procedures under [the IDEA] shall be
exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the
action been brought under this subchapter.63
Congress added that provision to overturn the Supreme Court’s
1984 decision in Smith v. Robinson.64 Smith held that the IDEA
implicitly barred disabled children from enforcing education rights
under other federal statutes, such as the Rehabilitation Act and
Section 1983.65 Rejecting Smith, the new text made clear that the
IDEA did not foreclose parents from bringing suit under “other
Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.”
But it required parents first to pursue IDEA remedies if their
complaints were ones “seeking relief that is also available under”
the IDEA.
The Frys’ suit challenged the refusal to permit Ehlena to be
accompanied by her service dog—a challenge that would have
been essentially identical if Ehlena had been seeking access to a
public library or recreation facility rather than a school, and one
that would have been identical if a disabled parent had been denied
the chance to bring the parent’s service dog to watch a child at
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
65
See id. at 1009-1016.
63
64
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a school play. The educational setting, and Ehlena’s status as a
student, thus were simply the occasion for the controversy; they
played no substantive role in it. The Frys were seeking relief for
a pure ADA violation, not a violation of the IDEA. Moreover,
they sought only emotional distress damages—a remedy that is not
available under the IDEA.66 For these two reasons, they argued
that exhaustion of the IDEA processes was not required. But
the lower courts read the exhaustion requirement more broadly.
Following the overwhelmingly dominant view in the circuits,
the Sixth Circuit held that exhaustion of IDEA proceedings was
required whenever it appeared possible that those proceedings
could provide some remedy for the injuries of which the child
complained—even if the remedy was a different one than the child
sought in her lawsuit.67
The Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicted with the Ninth Circuit’s
2011 en banc holding in Payne v. Peninsula School District.68
In contrast to the “injury-centered” rule employed by the Sixth
Circuit and other courts of appeals, Payne adopted what it called
a “relief-centered” rule governing IDEA exhaustion: If the relief
the plaintiff actually sought was, in form or substance, relief that
was available under the IDEA, exhaustion was required; but if the
plaintiff did not actually seek relief that was available under the
IDEA—even if such relief might have been available—the nonIDEA case could proceed directly to court.69
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fry, presumably to
resolve that conflict. But the Court ultimately punted on the issue.
In a footnote, the Court explained that it was “leav[ing] for another
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 752 n.4.
See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 788 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir. 2015).
68
Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1196
(2012).
69
Id. at 874.
66
67
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day” the question whether “exhaustion [is] required when the
plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE, but the specific remedy
she requests—here, money damages for emotional distress—is
not one that an IDEA hearing officer may award.”70 Instead,
the Court resolved the case on a more fundamental ground.
Regardless of the particular relief the plaintiff requests, the Court
unanimously held, exhaustion is not required in a non-IDEA case
if the “substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff’s complaint” is
not “seek[ing] relief for the denial of a FAPE.”71 If the plaintiff
is not seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE, the Court held, her
complaint is necessarily not “seeking relief that is also available
under” the IDEA.72
The Court remanded to the lower courts to determine whether
the “gravamen” of Fry’s complaint was seeking relief for the denial
of a FAPE. But Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court offered a
couple of guideposts for resolving that question, in Fry and in
other cases. The opinion suggested, first, that courts should “ask[]
a pair of hypothetical questions” about the complaint:
 irst, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the
F
same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a
public facility that was not a school—say, a public theater
or library? And second, could an adult at the school—say,
an employee or visitor—have pressed essentially the
same grievance?73
“When the answer to those questions is yes,” the Court
explained, “a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 752 n.4.
Id. at 752.
72
Id. at 754.
73
Id. at 756.
70
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a FAPE is also unlikely to be truly about that subject; after all, in
those other situations there is no FAPE obligation and yet the same
basic suit could go forward.”74 The Court also said that parents’
prior decision to invoke the formal IDEA proceedings to resolve
a particular dispute “will often”—but not always—“provide
strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff’s claim concerns
the denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly uses
that term.”75 Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, joined all
of Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court except for the discussion
of the guideposts for resolving the gravamen-of-the-complaint
question.76
B. Fry as an Equality Case
The Fry decision is important on its own terms. Even as
questions remain regarding how the lower courts will interpret the
new gravamen-of-the-complaint standard, the decision marks a
major shift from prior lower-court cases. In those cases, the courts
asked a hypothetical question: Could the plaintiffs have sought
any relief for their injuries under the IDEA? Because it is nearly
always possible for IDEA proceedings to provide some relief for
injuries received at school—even in the form of counseling to
address emotional harms—the hypothetical-question approach
meant that parents were required to exhaust IDEA administrative
proceedings in a wide range of cases that did not at all involve the
substance of the educational program, or the choice of educational
setting, offered to their children. Cases involving denial of access
to service dogs (like Ehlena Fry’s suit) and those involving abusive

Id. at 756.
Id. at 757.
76
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 759 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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mistreatment of disabled children at school were prime examples.77
Most if not all of these cases will now be able to proceed directly
to court under the ADA or Section 1983; the plaintiffs will thus be
able to avoid burdensome and unavailing IDEA proceedings.
As I have said, nothing in the Fry decision is formally about
equality. Fry was a case about administrative exhaustion, not
the substantive requirements that apply to schools’ treatment of
children with disabilities. But the decision has great importance
for educational equality. The ADA, unlike the IDEA, formally
incorporates an equal-opportunity standard. The state and
local government entities covered by the ADA—including
public schools—must not discriminate against individuals with
disabilities, and they must “make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless
the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or
activity.”78
Ehlena Fry’s suit alleged that her school had violated this
equal-opportunity standard: By refusing to make a “reasonable
modification” to its no-dogs rule to permit her to use her service
dog, the school denied Ehlena the same independence that her
fellow students had. If her fellow students dropped something,
they would not have to ask an adult to pick it up for them. Wonder
allowed Ehlena to achieve the same kind of independence. By
barring the dog, and requiring her to rely on a one-on-one human
S ee, e.g., Cave v. East Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring
exhaustion of IDEA proceedings in case alleging refusal to admit service dog); Charlie F. v. Bd.
of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring exhaustion of IDEA
proceedings in case alleging that teacher orchestrated disability-based harassment of a fourth
grader).
78
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i) (2015).
77
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aide, the school denied her equal independence.
That equality claim was entirely distinct from any possible
IDEA claim that Ehlena’s education was substantively inadequate
and thus denied a FAPE. By making clear that the ADA-based
claim could proceed—and could avoid administrative exhaustion
if it was sufficiently distinct from an IDEA claim—the Court
highlighted the continued significance of the ADA’s equality
requirements in the education setting.
It is important to appreciate, however, that the ADA’s equality
requirements are quite different from the equality requirements the
Court rejected in Rowley and Endrew F. In those cases, the Court
considered whether the IDEA incorporated a requirement that
disabled children receive an equal opportunity to achieve certain
educational outcomes—notably, to achieve their potential. As I
argued above, the equal-opportunity-to-achieve-potential standard
is difficult to operationalize and raises troubling normative
questions.79
But the equality standard as it has been applied under the
ADA is more grounded. Rather than asking whether persons with
a disability have an equal opportunity to achieve some ultimate
outcome, ADA cases focus on whether the refusal to modify a
government entity’s practices denies disabled persons some more
precisely defined opportunity that nondisabled persons receive.
For Ehlena Fry, that more precisely defined opportunity was
independence in performing physical tasks. But in other education
cases the opportunity might touch much more closely on the
content of a student’s lessons.
Consider the facts of Rowley. Amy Rowley was a deaf student,
who asked her school to provide a sign-language interpreter during
79

See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
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class. The school refused and instead provide her an FM hearing
aid.80 Even with the hearing aid, she could make out “less than
half of what [was] said in the classroom.”81 Her nondisabled
fellow students, by contrast, could hear essentially everything. The
Court concluded that there was no IDEA violation, because she
was benefiting sufficiently from the education to “perform[] better
than the average child in her class” and “advanc[e] easily from
grade to grade.”82 And, as we have seen, the Court rejected the
argument that the IDEA required schools to give disabled students
an equal opportunity to achieve their potential.
But what if we applied the ADA’s equality standard to the facts
of Rowley? Just as Ehlena Fry argued that the ADA required her
school to permit her to use a service dog so she could have the
same opportunity as her nondisabled classmates to be physically
independent within the school, a student in Amy Rowley’s position
could argue today that the ADA requires her school to use a signlanguage interpreter so she can have the same opportunity as her
nondisabled classmates to hear the words spoken in the classroom.
The interpreter might in fact help provide the student an equal
opportunity, vis-à-vis her nondisabled classmates, to achieve her
potential, but equal opportunity to achieve potential is not the
standard. Equal opportunity to comprehend the words spoken in
class is. Applying that equal-opportunity-to-comprehend standard
could flip the result in Rowley.83
The ADA’s equality standard is far more administrable than
is the potential-based standard that the Court rejected under the
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184-85.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 215 (White, J., dissenting).
82
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209-10.
83
See K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that hard-of-hearing students could proceed on their ADA claim to require their schools
to provide them real-time transcription of class discussions, even though Rowley doomed such a
claim under the IDEA), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1493 (2014).
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IDEA. Under the ADA standard, the plaintiff needs only to:
(1) identify the particular task or benefit that her nondisabled
fellow students enjoy but she does not (physical independence,
perceiving all of the words in the classroom, etc.); (2) point to
a reasonable modification to school rules or policies that would
rectify that inequality (a service dog, a sign-language interpreter);
and if necessary (3) defend against the school’s claim that the
modification would be so burdensome as to “fundamentally alter
the nature of” the school’s activities.84 We don’t have to guess at
what a student’s potential is or would be, or at how often other
students get to achieve their full potential.
Is the ADA’s equality standard normatively attractive? The
ADA, of course, has been an incredibly controversial law—
and educational accommodations for students with disabilities
have been particularly controversial.85 We want schools to give
everyone the same chance to learn, but resources are limited. At
some point, giving to one student takes from another student.
What, we might ask, makes disabled students more worthy than
others?
Outside of the education context, I have argued that the
ADA’s accommodation requirement is justified by the systematic
disadvantage that society attaches to disability.86 When a relatively
small change in an institution’s practices can keep the institution
from contributing to that disadvantage by denying an opportunity
to a person with a disability, it is appropriate to require the change.
I have argued that this is basically the justification for classic
antidiscrimination laws, which—even when they don’t mandate

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i) (2015).
See Backlash Against the ADA: Reinterpreting Disability Rights (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed.,
2003).
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See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825 (2003).
84
85

44

Educational Equality for Children with Disabilities

reasonable accommodations—require employers and others to
bear some costs to avoid contributing to systematic disadvantage.
Employers, for example, are barred from discriminating against
women and minorities even if customers refuse to be served by
them and instead choose to patronize competing businesses.87 And
employers are barred from discriminating against pregnant women,
even if it is “more expensive or less convenient to” give pregnant
workers the same accommodations that other employees receive.88
We impose these requirements, not to prevent employers from
being individually irrational, but to prevent them from contributing
to the systematic disadvantage experienced by minorities and
women in the workforce.
Inside of the public education context, the normative
argument for accommodations to achieve equal opportunity
is even stronger. Although there is a robust debate over the
purpose of public education, at the core is opportunity for all—to
participate in economic and/or civic life. An institution with the
mission of providing opportunity is in less of a position to deny
accommodations like this than is an institution (like an employer)
with the mission of making money.89 The equality standard
to which Fry opens the way is thus a far more tractable and
defensible equality standard than the one Endrew F. rejected.
IV. C
 onclusion: The Equality Question the Court Did
Not Ask
To this point, I have focused on the equality questions
in Endrew F. and Fry from the perspective of students with
disabilities. I have asked how the Court’s decisions in these cases
See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981).
See Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015).
89
See Walzer, supra note 24, at 197-226.
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might affect the degree to which disabled students are treated
equally to their nondisabled peers along various axes. And I have
examined the administrability of, and normative arguments for, the
Court’s approach to these equality questions. As I show in Part II,
the Court in Endrew F. rejected an equality standard for defining a
free appropriate public education under the IDEA, but the robust
adequacy standard the Court adopted is one that is necessarily
based on a broader concern with equality. And, as I show in Part
III, the Court in Fry opened the door to the independent application
of an equal-opportunity standard under the ADA—a standard that
could well reverse the result in the Rowley case. Each of these
holdings seems to me quite defensible.
When one takes a different perspective, though, one can see
another equality question in the background of these cases—one
to which the Court did not explicitly advert, but one that plays
an important role in broader debates regarding the education of
disabled students. That question is this: Does a special focus
on the rights of students with disabilities inherently discriminate
against all, or some subset of, nondisabled children?
In Part III.B., I argued that accommodation of students with
disabilities is appropriate because of the systematic disadvantage
that disabled people experience in our society. But there are, of
course, other groups that experience systematic disadvantage.
The overlapping categories of poor people, African-Americans,
and Latinos are obvious examples. If giving enforceable rights
to educational accommodations to disabled children comes at the
expense of these groups, we have reason to worry that the IDEA
and ADA are impeding equality, at least along some important
dimensions. A recent decision by a state trial court in Connecticut
seemed to suggest that the IDEA was having just such a troubling
effect, by diverting resources from children in poorer school
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districts.90 Some years ago, Professors Mark Kelman and Gillian
Lester argued that our disability laws, as applied to education,
attempted to avoid the difficult tradeoffs that were necessary
here by elevating to the status of a “right” something that is more
properly understood as a mere redistributive “claim” that should
be resolved as part of pluralist political bargaining.91 Underlying
both of these arguments is the concern that richer, white parents are
better able than poorer, minority parents to navigate the disability
laws to obtain accommodations for their children.92
These are extremely important issues that I cannot resolve
in this essay. But there are good reasons for caution before fully
accepting the narrative that gains for children with disabilities
come at the expense of poor and minority children. For one thing,
many poor and minority children themselves have disabilities.
Rates of disability are higher in poor communities, for all sorts of
unsurprising reasons.93 Indeed, some of the strongest supporters
of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act—the law that
became the IDEA—were established civil rights groups that had
traditionally focused on racial equality. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, they saw that many children who were poor and members
of racial minority groups were denied access to educational
opportunities because school districts labeled those children
as disabled.94 Those groups thus concluded that any response
 onnecticut Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 2016 WL 4922730 at *27-*32 (Conn.
C
Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2016).
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833 (2001).
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to educational inequality would have to address disability—a
conclusion that continues to seem valid today.
Still, there are lingering concerns. There is a longstanding
concern that school districts over-identify certain, more
stigmatizing, disabilities (notably emotional disturbance and
developmental disabilities) among minority children, while overidentify other, less stigmatizing, disabilities (notably autism)
among whites.95 These disparate patterns of identification can
divert minority students into much more limiting and stigmatizing
educational programs than are experienced by similarly situated
white students. Any effort to promote educational equality must
address that problem. It must also address the barriers that poor
and working-class parents face in taking advantage of the IDEA
or the ADA.96 Although there is no particular reason to believe
that these barriers are any greater for poor people in the education
context than in many others, the IDEA and ADA will not provide
true equality until we address them.
The Endrew F. and Fry cases, in other words, represent
important steps toward achieving educational inequality. But many
key steps remain.
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